Marabda-Kartsakhi Railway's Geo-Economical Commitments and Their Implications for Georgia's European Integration

Abstract

Introduction: The Baku–Tbilisi–Kars (BTK) railway and its Georgian section, the Marabda–Kartsakhi railway, represent an important case for examining the relationship between infrastructure financing, external dependency, strategic autonomy, and European integration. This study assesses whether the project’s debt and governance structure may create conditions for structural dependency and potential external leverage affecting Georgia’s strategic autonomy and its broader European integration trajectory. Methods: The study employs content analysis, case-study analysis, and comparative analysis. Documents were selected purposively from three categories: primary institutional and financial sources, secondary academic and policy literature, and relevant European legal and policy documents. The analysis covers the period 2007–2026 and applies six analytical dimensions: financial asymmetry, governance control, normative compatibility, structural leverage potential, temporal convergence, and comparative configuration. Moldova, Armenia, and Georgia were compared using purposive case selection informed by Most Similar Systems and Most Different Systems approaches. The interpretation was guided by Critical Geopolitical Economy, Neo-Dependency Theory, and the External Governance approach to Europeanisation. Results: The analysis identifies a substantial financial asymmetry arising from the USD 775 million Azerbaijani loan and an evolution in governance from creditor supervision toward direct institutional co-management following the establishment of BTKI Railways LLC in 2024. These developments indicate the emergence of conditions for structural dependency and potential external leverage. However, the available evidence does not demonstrate that such leverage has been actively used to influence specific political decisions. The comparative analysis suggests three distinct configurations: inherited dependency in Moldova, geographically constrained dependency in Armenia, and a form of politically mediated or “elective” dependency in Georgia. The temporal concurrence between the deepening of BTK governance integration and the slowdown of Georgia’s European integration is analytically significant but insufficient to establish causality. Conclusion: The Marabda–Kartsakhi case demonstrates how long-term infrastructure financing and governance arrangements can shape the strategic choices available to a state without necessarily constituting direct political coercion. The study concludes that Georgia’s BTK-related obligations create a structural vulnerability that warrants greater transparency, institutional scrutiny, and periodic assessment against EU accession-related governance standards. The findings support interpreting infrastructure dependency as a dynamic political-economic condition rather than as a deterministic obstacle to European integration.